CO129-580-1 Sino-Japanese War- handing over of suspected terrorists to Japanese authorities 1-5-1939 - 24-8-1939 — Page 62

NO TRAC

2.

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is that we should lose it altogether not only in North China but throughout the country if we allowed Japanese to

threaten us into submission.

5. Meanwhile Japanese have disclosed their real motives by widening of their demands. Handing over the

It is this and that that 4 men is no longer what matters. they want (see my telegram No. 547). This puts an entirely new light on the affair and one which we cannot ignore.

6. I thought it desirable privately to take the view of Shanghai business men who may be said to represent public opinion here. While some of them thought we had made too much of the moral issue, they were unanimous in the opinion that it would be disastrous to yield now. They thought that sooner or later a showdown was inevitable in Tientsin elsewhere and that it was imperative that we should stand

fast.

or

7. During meeting Butterfield and Swire received telegram from Hongkong to the effect that Commander-in-Chief and General-Officer-Commanding considered matter should now be made a test case and that we should resort to reprisals if necessary. Everyone present shared this view.

8. I have not yet heard from Commander-in-Chief. Addressed to Foreign Office No. 555 of June 15, repeated to Tokyo No. 348, Tientsin No. 180, Commander-in-

Chief No. 217.